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Abstract
I outline Bell’s vision of the “great enterprise” of science, and his
view that conventional teachings about quantum mechanics consti-
tuted a betrayal of this enterprise. I describe a proposal of his to put
the theory on a more satisfactory footing, and review the subsequent
uses that have been made of one element of this proposal, namely
Bell’s transition probabilities regarded as fundamental physical pro-
cesses.
1 Introdution: The Great Enterprise
John Bell was a scientist. That was a vocation that he followed with great
respect, devotion and sense of responsibility. For him, to be a scientist was to
participate in the “great enterprise” [7] of understanding the world we live in;
in particular, to be a physicist was to pursue the grand vision of describing
the physical world in terms of its ultimate constituents and delineating how
those constituents behave. The great enterprise is undertaken according to
the scientific method: first, carefully observe and experiment to see how what
happens in the world; second, imaginatively construct theories to explain
these observations; third, rigorously test these theories by calculating what
they predict for the results of further experiments. If these predictions are
successful, we can feel, diffidently and tentatively, that we have made progress
towards our original goal of truly describing and understanding the world.
When Bell embarked on his career as a physicist, the furthest advances
towards the goal of physics were represented by quantum mechanics, as de-
veloped and expounded by Bohr, Born and Heisenberg. All the professional
training he received followed the teaching of these great men: not only their
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discoveries, but also their pronouncements on how these discoveries should
be regarded, and how future physics should be conducted. Bell was puzzled
and dismayed. He felt that everything he was taught constituted a betrayal
of the great enterprise: a surrender to the difficulties of the pursuit, and an
insistence that there was no alternative but to join the leaders of the field in
retreat.
The doctrine which he found all physicists were expected to accept seemed
to him to be a distortion of the scientific method. It dismissed, or forgot,
the purpose of the method, and held up the method itself as if the very
essence of science was contained in the third of these steps: the purpose of
physics is to predict the results of experiments. It was a central feature of
quantum mechanics, according to the founding fathers, that it could only
describe the results of experiments. The aim of describing the world apart
from experiments was totally and explicitly abandoned. This doctrine was
criticised, in a text-book influenced by Bell, as follows:
It cannot be true that the sole purpose of a scientific theory is to
predict the results of experiments. Why on earth would anyone
want to predict the results of experiments? Most of them have
no practical use; and even if they had, practical usefulness has
nothing to do with scientific enquiry. Predicting the results of
experiments is not the purpose of a theory, it is a test to see if
the theory is true. The purpose of a theory is to understand the
physical world. ([11], p. 214)
In Bell’s own words,
To restrict quantum mechanics to be exclusively about piddling
laboratory operations is to betray the great enterprise.
Bell’s unhappiness with this situation led him to examine the possibility of
explaining the results of quantum mechanics in terms of “hidden variables” —
some way of describing the actual disposition of the material world, regardless
of whether any experiments were being done. In the early 1960s it was known
that this could be done, following David Bohm’s revival in 1952 of a model
proposed by Louis de Broglie in 1927. However, although this was known,
it was not widely known; indeed, it was generally thought to be impossible
because of Pauli’s early opposition, to which de Broglie himself surrendered,
and a supposed proof by the respected mathematician John von Neumann.
But as Bell wrote [3], “In 1952 I saw the impossible done”. In [3] he analysed
the reasons why it continued to be the accepted opinion that hidden variables
were impossible, and acknowledged that there were good reasons not to like
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the de Broglie/Bohm model; Einstein, for example, whom Bell followed in
his dissatisfaction with quantum mechanics, found this solution “cheap”. It
made sense, therefore, for Bell to look at the full range of possible hidden-
variable models; and in doing so he discovered that one particular reason
for disliking the de Broglie/Bohm model was unavoidable: any such model
would necessarily exhibit nonlocality, the feature that distant parts of the
model would affect each other instantaneously. This discovery is what Bell
is famous for. Most of the papers in this issue of Quanta will be devoted
to this topic. In this paper, however, I want to focus on one of his later
contributions to the project of rescuing the great enterprise. But I should
emphasise that there is no substitute for reading Bell’s contributions in his
own wonderfully elegant and entertaining sentences [6].
2 Beables
For Bell, the feature of nonlocality, or action at a distance, was no reason
to reject a theory. It might be surprising, it might be difficult to reconcile
with special relativity, and it might, as it did for Einstein, defy one’s pre-
supposition of what a scientific description of the world should look like; but
this is outweighed by the virtue of actually giving a description of the world,
independent of human beings and “piddling laboratory operations” [7]. In
conversation, Bell would emphasise that he would encourage anyone working
on a theory with this overriding virtue. He put aside his own opinions as
to whether the work was likely to be successful; the important thing was
to get physicists thinking in a healthy, “professional” [4] way. And he was
enormously helpful and supportive: I remember, at a conference in 1987,
diffidently giving him the manuscript of a paper at the end of one afternoon.
Despite attending an alcoholic reception that evening, he sought me out the
next morning to give me detailed comments.
Bell’s hostility to the official version of quantum mechanics, as preached
in nearly all university physics courses, is emblazoned in the two words of the
title of his paper “Against ‘measurement’” [7]. Another key word to which
he took exception is “observable”. This is the only word available in the
official theory to refer to properties of physical objects; it insists that the
only quantities that can have any place in a physical theory are those which
can be measured, or observed. In line with his conviction that a theory
should describe physical objects themselves, regardless of their relation to
human observers, Bell proposed [2] to replace the word “observable” by a new
coinage of “beable” to emphasise the autonomous existence of the quantities
in question.
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In the Bohm/de Broglie theory of non-relativistic many-particle quantum
mechanics, the beables are the positions of the particles. This might be one
of the reasons why the theory is not universally liked. A fundamental feature
of the conventional theory is that all the quantities of classical mechanics, i.e.
functions on phase space, have quantum counterparts which enter the theory
on an equal footing, as they do in Hamiltonian mechanics. This symmetry
under canonical transformations, becoming unitary symmetry in quantum
mechanics, is widely regarded as very attractive. It is explicitly broken in
de Broglie/Bohm theory. Bell defended this, arguing that all actual obser-
vations in experimental physics come down to measurements of position (of
pointers in instruments, for example). This strikes me as dubious, and any-
way it represents a reliance on experimental considerations which is curiously
inappropriate in the author of Against “measurement”. However, in the pa-
per in which I now want to focus [4], Bell addressed a more serious problem:
de Broglie/Bohm theory is non-relativistic, and is a theory of a finite num-
ber of particles. On the other hand, the fundamental theories which Bell
was seeking as an elementary particle physicist would have to be relativistic,
and they would have to be theories of fields, not particles. Hence his title:
Beables for quantum field theory.
In this paper Bell tackled only one of these desiderata. He proposed a
quantum theory of fields with a clearly defined set of beables, quantities with
privileged ontological status, and with dynamics which reproduced the pre-
dictions of orthodox quantum theory, just as the Bohm/de Broglie equation
of motion reproduces the predictions of the Schro¨dinger equation. But his
theory is not relativistic. He assumes an absolute distinction between space
and time, in which time is continuous but space is taken to be a discrete
three-dimensional lattice L. The beables of the theory are the total num-
bers of fermions at the points of the lattice. These fermion numbers are the
eigenvalues of the field operators
B(x) =
∑
i
ψi(x)
†ψi(x), x ∈ L
where ψi is a particular variety of Dirac field, labelled by i, and the sum is
over all such varieties. Thus the actual situation of the world, is given by
the set of integers {F (x) : x ∈ L} representing numbers of fermions at all
points of the lattice. Bell does not consider it necessary or even possible
for the numbers of different types of fermion to be beables, since interacting
fields will not all commute. He regards microscopic details such as these as
“entirely redundant. What is essential is to be able to define the positions
of things”, by which he seems to mean things that we would recognise in
our macroscopic world. His only elucidation of these “things” is that they
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should include “positions of instrument pointers or (the modern equivalent)
of ink on computer output”. This is not intended to be exhaustive: it is not
that these are the only beables but that the beables must at least include
the positions of instrument pointers.
3 Transition probabilities
In Bell’s model the state of the world at each time t is given by an element n(t)
of the discrete set of functions n : L → N (N being the set of non-negative
integers), so each n is a set of non-negative integers, one for each lattice
point. The change of this state with time is governed, as in de Broglie/Bohm
theory, by a time-dependent element |Ψ(t)〉 of a Hilbert space spanned by
eigenvectors of the field operators. We ae used to calling |Ψ(t)〉 a “state
vector”, but in this theory that terminology is misleading: |Ψ(t)〉 does not
describe a state of the world, but something that governs change in the state
of the world. Let us call it the “pilot vector”, in memory of the pilot wave of
dBB theory. However, the value of |Ψ(t)〉 is a fact about the world, and Bell
therefore considered |Ψ(t)〉, as well as n(t), to be a beable. The complete
specification of the world at time t is then given by the pair (n(t), |Ψ(t)〉).
The way that the world changes in time is an adaptation of the evolution
equations of de Broglie/Bohm theory. As in that theory, the pilot vector
|Ψ(t)〉 evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation with a Hamiltonian H :
i~
d
dt
|Ψ(t)〉 = H|Ψ(t)〉.
Because the possible values of n(t) are a discrete set, however, the change
from one value to another is stochastic: Bell postulates that if, at time t,
the value of the total fermion number distribution is m, then the probability
that at time t + δt its value has changed to n is w
mn
δt where the transition
probability w
mn
is given by
w
mn
=
{
2Re[(i~)−1〈n|H|m〉cncm]
〈ψ(t)|Pm |ψ(t)〉
if this is ≥ 0
0 if it is negative
(3.1)
where P
m
is the projection onto the subspace of simultaneous eigenstates
of the local occupation number operators B(x) in which the eigenvalue of
B(x) is m(x). Bell then shows that this joint time development is consistent
with the probabilities given by the Born rule in the same sense as in dBB
theory: if the Born rule holds at some initial time, i.e. the value of the total
fermion number distribution at that time is given probabilistically so that
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the probability of the distribution m is 〈Ψ(0)|P
m
|Ψ(0)〉, then this remains
true at all subsequent times.
Bell found the stochastic nature of this time development “unwelcome”;
he suspected that it was purely a consequence of his artificial assumption
of a discrete lattice of points of space, and that it would “go away in some
sense in the continuum limit”. Indeed, it was shown by Vink [16] and my-
self [12], working independently, that a stochastic model of a particle on a
one-dimensional lattice, modelled on this theory of Bell’s, did become the
deterministic dBB theory in the continuum limit. Bell’s unease arose from
his respect for the time-reversal invariance of both quantum and classical
mechanics, in the forms of Schro¨dinger’s equation and Newton’s equations
of motion. Others, however, have welcomed both stochastic elements in fun-
damental theory, as reflecting our actual experience of quantum phenomena,
and non-invariance under time reversal, as reflecting the true nature of time.
(“Others” here possibly means just myself [13].)
The transition probabilities introduced by Bell can be used in a wide
variety of theories, not restricted to those which postulate a special class of
quantities which are “beable”. In general, consider a theory which supposes
that there is a true description of the world by means of a vector |Ψ(t)〉 which
evolves according to a Schro¨dinger equation with Hamiltonian H , and that
there is some reason to give special consideration to one of the components
of this vector in a decomposition given by special subspaces Sn of the Hilbert
space H, known as viable subspaces. Thus H is the orthogonal direct sum of
the subspaces Sn, and any |Ψ〉 ∈ H can be written
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|ψn(t)〉 with |ψn(t)〉 ∈ Sn.
Then |ψn(t)〉 = Pn|Ψ(t)〉 where Pn is the orthogonal projection onto the sub-
space Sn. As |Ψ(t)〉 changes in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation,
the components |ψn(t)〉 = Pn|Ψ(t)〉 will also change inside their respective
viable subspaces; but in addition to this, the spotlight shining on the com-
ponent with special status will also move stochastically from one subspace
to another. This stochastic change is given by Bell’s transition probabilities:
if the special component is in subspace Sm at time t, then the probability
that it has moved to subspace Sn by time t+ δt is wmnδt where wmn is given
by (3.1). If the viable subspaces Sn are themselves changing with time, then
there is an extra term in this equation ([1, 13]).
I will refer to theories with this structure as “generalised Bell-type theo-
ries”. All such theories share the property proved by Bell for his version of
quantum field theory: the transition probabilities (3.1) guarantee the con-
tinuing validity of the Born rule if it is valid initially. They are not uniquely
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determined by this requirement: there is a range of possible transition prob-
abilities with the same property [1]. However, Bell’s formula is uniquely
natural in applications to decay [13] and measurement processes [15, 10]:
it ensures that the underlying direction of change in such processes is al-
ways forwards, without intermittent reversals (decay products, for example,
recombining to reconstitute the unstable decaying state).
In many such theories the special status of the highlighted component
|ψn(t)〉 is ontological; only this component describes the actual state of the
world, and the function of the overall vector |Ψ(t)〉 is to act as a pilot, guiding
the discontinuous quantum transitions of the world. Such theories are liable
to face a preferred basis problem: what defines the viable subspaces Sn?
Bell formulated the concept of beables precisely to give an answer to this
problem: the viable subspaces are the eigenspaces of beables. In the original
dBB theory, the beables are the particle positions. We have already noted
on the one hand the unease this arouses because of its violation of symmetry
under canonical transformations, and on the other hand Bell’s defence of it
on the grounds that ultimately all observations are of position.
In Bell’s theory in [4], the beables are the total fermion numbers at each
point in the lattice of space. At first sight it seems reasonable that these
should have fundamental status, but this is thrown into doubt by the Unruh
effect, according to which the number of particles present in a region of space
depends on a frame of reference as soon as one moves away from frames in
constant relative motion.
This preferred-basis problem is also often thought to arise in the “many-
worlds” interpretation of quantum mechanics. That theory has only the
universal state vector |Ψ(t)〉 and does not single out a component of that
vector as describing the actual world. Nevertheless, if the vector |Ψ(t)〉 is
regarded as describing many worlds, all of which are real, then some com-
mentators, including Bell [5], demand that there should be a specification
of which vectors or subspaces can describe “worlds”. However, this is not a
problem in Everett’s original version [8] of this interpretation but only arises
when too much weight is placed on the expository terminology of “worlds”
([11] p. 221). Even with this terminology, the components of the state vector
|Ψ(t)〉 which describe worlds can be determined by the structure of |Ψ(t)〉
itself [17] and need no independent definition.
Other generalised Bell-type theories have no preferred-basis problem,
defining the viable subspaces purely in terms of the pilot vector |Ψ(t)〉. In
the (now largely discarded) modal interpretation, in which the universe is
divided into two systems so that the Hilbert space H is a tensor product of
two factors, the viable components are defined by the Schmidt decomposition
of |Ψ(t)〉 with respect to this structure.
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The format of a generalised Bell-type theory is appropriate to describe
the changing experience of a sentient subsystem of the physical universe [14].
This can be done in the context of Everettian theory, in which the universe
is described by a single time-dependent state vector |Ψ(t)〉, and nothing
else. We know that the universe has sentient subsystems, each of which is
capable of experiences relating to the rest of the universe. I am myself such
a subsystem. I have various possible experiences, for each of which there is a
set of physical states of my body in which I have the experience. Since I can
distinguish between the experiences (if I couldn’t they wouldn’t be different
experiences), it seems to be in keeping with quantum mechanics that the
corresponding states form a set of orthogonal subspaces Smen of my Hilbert
spaceHme. These subspaces then define a set of subspaces Sn = S
me
n ⊗Hrest of
the universal Hilbert space H = Hme ⊗Hrest. The changes in my experience
then constitute transitions between these subspaces. Bell’s formula (3.1)
gives the probabilities of these transitions, subject to a universal state vector
and a universal Hamiltonian.
This formalism can also be used [15, 10] to model the progress of a quan-
tum measurement.
4 Histories
Once a significant set of preferred subspaces has been identified for each time
t, a generalised Bell-type theory makes it possible to calculate probabilities
for histories of the system. It is usual, and convenient, to consider only a
discrete set of times t1, . . . , tf ; then a history of the system is a sequence
(S1, . . . ,Sf) where each Si is a closed subspace of the Hilbert space of the
system, or equivalently a sequence of projection operators h = (Π1, . . . ,Πf)
where Πi is the projection onto Si. Such histories are the fundamental con-
cepts in the consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics [9], in
which the probability of the history h is taken to be
P (h) = tr[Π˜1 . . . Π˜f−1Π˜f Π˜f−1 . . . Π˜1] (4.1)
where
Π˜i = e
iHt/~Πie
−iHt/~.
This probability can be obtained from the Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics by assuming that at each time ti there is a measurement
of an observable whose eigenspaces include Si, and applying the projection
postulate after each measurement. Then P (h) is the probability that this
sequence of measurements has the results corresponding to the subspaces
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S1, . . .Sn. It can be written
p(h) = tr[ChC
†
h]
where Ch is the history operator
Ch = Π˜1 · · · Π˜f . (4.2)
In general, these probabilities will not be consistent with the following
natural requirement. Suppose two histories h1 and h2 differ only in the
subspaces S
(1)
i and S
(2)
i which they assign to time ti, and that these subspaces
are orthogonal. We can consider a third history h1∨h2 in which the subspace
at time ti is the direct sum S1⊕S2. In terms of measurement, this describes a
result of the measurement at time ti which was either the result corresponding
to S1 or that corresponding to S2; so h1 ∨ h2 relates that the history of the
system was either h1 or h2. We expect that the corresponding probabilities
should satisfy
P (h1 ∨ h2) = P (h1) + P (h2).
In particular, if S1 ⊕ S2 = H, we expect that S1 and S2 are an exhaustive
set of possibilities at time ti and so
P (h1) + P (h2) = P (h
′)
where h′ is the history which coincides with h1 and h2 at all times except ti,
but does not say anything about time ti. However, these equations will not
in general be true. A condition which guarantees them is
tr[Ch1C
†
h2
] = 0. (4.3)
A set of histories is said to be consistent (or decoherent) if this condition
holds true for every pair of different histories in the set.
This is not an issue in generalised Bell-type theories. It would be an issue
if the transition probabilities (3.1) were supposed to apply for transitions to
any subspace in the Boolean algebra generated by the subspaces Si, but that
would not be in accord with the basic presuppositions of such a theory. To
take a linear sum of the preferred subspaces as having the same status as
those subspaces would be to assume that the system could exist in a super-
position of states from the preferred subspaces, whereas the philosophy of
these theories is that such superpositions are not actual states. In the theory
of sentient experience, for example, a sum of experience states describing
different experiences is not an experience state (a sum of eigenvectors with
different eigenvalues is not an eigenvector). Thus the state of the system can
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be in a subspace S1⊕S2 only if it is in the subset S1∪S2, and the appropriate
probability is
P (S1 ⊕ S2) = P (S1) + P (S2).
In [14], where probabilities are identified with truth values, and a history
is formed by logical operations from single-time propositions, the probability
of a history was taken to be given by the usual formula (4.1). For the
development of a satisfactory logic, it was then found to be necessary to make
the consistent-histories assumption (4.3) (in a somewhat weaker version). I
now think that this was a mistake. If Bell’s transition probabilities had been
used to define the truth value (= probability) of a history rather than (4.1),
there would have been no need for a subsidiary assumption, and the logic
could have been developed in much greater generality.
5 Conclusion
John Bell never lost sight of the great enterprise of science. He rejected the
narrow scepticism and pessimism in the reaction of the founding fathers of
quantum mechanics to the difficulties which they encountered, and the in-
strumentalist view of physics which became the dogma in which all physics
students were indoctrinated. His own most famous and influential work only
served to emphasise the difficulties in the way of understanding quantum
mechanics as he thought physical theories should be understood. Neverthe-
less, he persevered in the search for such an understanding. His concept
of “beables” has become a standard tool for those seeking to understand
and develop quantum mechanics, and deserves deeper philosophical analysis.
The transition probabilities that he formulated as a component of theories of
such beables are a lasting legacy of his search, and have proved valuable even
to those who do not share his vision of what a satisfactory physical theory
should be like.
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